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Misra: Visual Awareness during a Visual Approach

Flight crew can land an aircraft on the runway through various methods
prescribed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Pilots can either visually
descend to the runway through a visual approach or land using instrument
references and radio or satellite equipment which are generally classified as
Instrument Approach Procedures (IAPs). Visual approach is a type of IAP that is
frequently used by Air Traffic Controllers to improve the efficiency of a runway by
increasing the arrival rate of aircraft (FAA, 2019).
While visual approaches are frequently used to increase efficiency and
reduce controller workload, visual approaches pose a risk when considering the
limitations of the human eye and visual awareness. Visual approaches require the
pilots to either have the preceding aircraft in sight or the airport in sight while
visually descending to the runway (FAA, 2019). Various visual stimuli that the
pilots need to be aware and conscious of to execute a safe visual approach procedure
test the limitations of visual awareness and pose risks that need to be identified and
studied. This study analyzed the threats of the failure of visual awareness during a
visual approach for transport category aircraft.
Literature Review
Visual Awareness
Visual awareness has been studied very widely in the field of neuroscience,
psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy. Visual awareness can be defined
“as the subjective sensation of seeing something” (Wyart & Tallon-Baudry, 2008,
p. 1). Li and Geng (2009) define visual awareness as a subjective visual experience.
The study of visual awareness is closely linked to studying visual consciousness,
visual stimuli, and visual attention (Li & Geng, 2009).
The presence of visual stimuli does not translate to visual awareness by a
human being. Li and Geng (2009) explain that under certain circumstances the
retina of a human being might observe stimuli, however it may fail to perceive
salient visual stimuli. This phenomenon has been studied in further detail by
researchers. In a book titled Inattentional Blindness authored by Mack and Rock
(1998), the authors conducted a study with 5,000 subjects from the University of
California Berkeley and studied various aspects of perception and attention. Mack
and Rock noted that as many as 25% of their participants failed to notice
unexpected peripheral stimuli.
Visual awareness is closely linked to visual attention. Visual attention can
be defined as a "set of cognitive operations that mediate the selection of relevant
information and the filtering out of irrelevant information from cluttered visual
scenes” (McMains & Kastner, 2009, p. 1). The studies of visual awareness, visual
attention, and visual consciousness led aviation human factors experts to focus on
studying visual scanning, collision avoidance, situational awareness, and task
saturation in more detail. Visual scanning, collision avoidance, situational
awareness, and task saturation will be covered in more detail.
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Visual Scanning and Collision Avoidance
Advisory Circular AC 98-40D titled ‘Pilots’ Role in Collision Avoidance’
issued by the Federal Aviation Administration on 19th April 2016 explains the
responsibility of pilots during flight in terms of visual scanning and collision
avoidance. The circular explains that “Pilots should remain constantly alert to all
traffic movement within their field of vision, as well as periodically scanning the
entire visual field outside of their aircraft to ensure detection of conflicting traffic”
(FAA, 2016a, p. 2). The advisory circular stresses the importance of see-and-avoid
procedures to prevent collisions.
FAA states that it takes about 12.5 seconds for a person to react to a threat
in flight (FAA, 2016a). The circular advises pilots of techniques to improve the
effectiveness of scanning outside the aircraft for traffic. It advises that if the pilot
does have any specific object to focus on, the eyes will revert to relaxed
intermediate focal distance which is about 10 to 30 feet. “This can be explained as
“looking without actually seeing anything” (FAA, 2016a, p. 2).
Through multiple experiments Colvin, Dodhia, and Dismukes (2005)
identify that humans are poor at monitoring and searching for targets that rarely
occur. In another study by Moiser, Skitka, Burdick, and Feer (1998) that studied
automation bias in the cockpit, it was observed that 81% of reported problems by
pilots stemmed from not effectively monitoring instruments during the cruise phase
of flight. Colvin et al. further explain that visual scanning is a cognitive process
rather than just a physical function of our eyes.
The Federal Aviation Administration Safety Team published an article
titled How to Avoid Mid-Air Collisions which identifies human factors as a major
factor that causes collisions (FAA Safety Team). It specifically illustrates visual
perception and limitations of visual scanning and the tendency of pilots to
overestimate their visual abilities.
Failure of Visual Awareness
Several research studies in the field of psychology and cognitive
psychology have demonstrated that people cannot retain all the details of the visual
stimuli they are presented from one moment to the next (Simons & Rensink, 2003).
Failure of visual awareness refers to the failure of human beings to retain or observe
fully visible stimuli which might be caused due to a variety of reasons.
Failure of visual awareness occurs due to attentional processing limitations
of human beings deter them from observing observable visual stimuli. Scientists
studying how people acquire and process visual information have observed a lapse
of visual awareness (Varkin, Levin, & Fidler, 2004). Failure of visual awareness
can be induced in multiple ways. Inattentional blindness, visual masking,
attentional blink, and change blindness are few of the many phenomena related to
the failure of visual awareness (Simons & Rensink, 2003).
Varkin et al. (2004) studied the application of the failure of visual awareness
in a human-computer interface and explained the application of their study in
aviation. They explained that the failure of visual awareness of the pilot about the
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instruments and Flight Management computer can lead to the pilot selecting
incorrect mode settings for the airplane that can have a fatal impact. The authors
further explain that “people are not only unaware of great amounts of visual
information but they are also unaware of the extent to which they may be unaware
of visual information” (Varakin et al., 2004, p. 391).
Inattentional blindness. Humans have a wide variety of visual stimuli
present at a point of time, but at each point, only a fraction of the available input
can be processed (Most, 2013). Humans perceive only a fraction of all the stimuli
as important. Selectivity is an important concept where there is a competition
among stimuli for selection (Horstmann & Ansorge, 2016). Inattentional blindness
is a failure of visual awareness where people fail to notice salient objects while
looking right at them. This is caused due to the fixation of attention on a second
object in the vicinity of the object (Most, 2013). Varakin et al. (2004, p. 392)
explain inattentional blindness as “attention on one thing reduces the degree to
which other, unattended things are processed.” Studies using eye-tracking devices
have demonstrated that inattentional blindness can occur when the eye of the person
is fixated directly on the object and the object is visible to anyone else whose
attention is not fixated on any other object.
Concerning the discussion earlier in this paper, to be visually aware of a
visual stimulus, a person needs to have visual attention on the stimuli. Inattentional
blindness is an illustration of that concept where visual attention plays a major role
in a person being visually aware of a visual stimulus. Selectivity of processing
information is an important aspect of attention. The selection of stimuli to which
humans delegate attention to depending on the demands of the current goals of the
human (Horstmann & Ansorge, 2016).
Another factor that plays a role in inattentional blindness is the difficulty of
the task (Most, 2013). A task that requires intensive attention is more likely to result
in inattentional blindness. Another phenomenon called cognitive load plays a vital
role in the extent of inattentional blindness. Cognitive load can be defined as “a
multidimensional construct representing the effort that performing a particular task
imposes on the actor's cognitive system” (Vrij, 2014, p. 2). Cognitive load is
formally studied under the Cognitive Load Theory (CLT) which is based on a
working memory that has limited capacity and time when it comes to retaining and
processing information (Pavlo, Pass, Grabner, & van Gog, 2010). Higher cognitive
load implies a person is exposed to higher information to process and retain that the
capacity of the working memory, which can lead to inattentional blindness.
Change blindness. Simons and Levin (1997, p. 1) describe change
blindness as "the inability to detect changes to an object or scene.” Change
blindness is the phenomenon and failure of visual awareness where people, under
certain circumstances, are poor at detecting large changes in the visual scene
(Simons & Levin, 1997). Change blindness highlights the role of attention in visual
awareness and visual change detection (Becker, 2013). The visual awareness of
human beings of their surroundings is far sparser than people believe it to be.
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Multiple experiments have been conducted to study change blindness in
human beings (Becker, 2013). Studies have mostly involved bringing about a rapid
change in an observable visual stimulus separated by a brief blank screen.
Participants have often failed to observe large changes in the visual stimuli if the
change is unexpected.
Visual masking. Visual masking is another failure of visual awareness
which “refers to the reduced visibility of one stimulus, called target, due to the
presence of another stimulus, called mask” (Ogemn & Breitmeyer, 2013). Visual
masking is a general term and it can be classified into a broad range of masking
effects types of target and masking stimuli. Masking by light is the most basic form
of visual masking which has two other subtypes: masking of light by light and
masking of pattern by light (Ogmen & Breitmeyer, 2013). Masking by light occurs
when the masking stimulus is a uniform field of light. The presence of a uniform
field of light as the masking stimulus can drastically reduce the visibility and clarity
of the target stimulus.
Enns and Lollo (2000) researched visual masking and other failures of
visual awareness. They concluded that attention is a crucial factor in visual
masking. They explained that "almost no masking occurs if attention can be rapidly
focused on the target, whereas powerful masking ensues if attention directed at the
target is delayed” (p. 1).
Visual Approach
A visual approach is conducted on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight
plan which authorizes the pilot to visually approach the runway while staying clear
of clouds (FAA, 2019). Before accepting a visual approach clearance, the pilot must
either have the airport in sight or the preceding identified aircraft in sight. The
reported weather for a visual approach must be at least 1,000 feet of ceiling and 3
Statute Miles of visibility. A visual approach does not constitute an instrument
approach procedure and does not have a published missed approach procedure. If a
go-around is executed, the air traffic controller will issue a new clearance for the
missed approach. The authorization for a visual approach does not constitute a
cancellation of an IFR flight plan (FAA, 2019).
A visual approach may be issued if it's "operationally beneficial" as it allows
for a reduction in "pilot/controller workload and expedites traffic by shortening
flight paths to the airport” (FAA, 2019, p. 5-4-61) When the pilot is following the
preceding aircraft, the responsibility of "safe approach interval" and wake
turbulence separation is handed off to the pilot. This reduces the pilot/controller
workload as well (FAA, 2019, p. 5-4-62).
When the pilot has the airport in sight but not the preceding aircraft in sight,
the separation and wake turbulence separation is the controller’s responsibility. The
Federal Aviation Administration published an Information for Operators in 2011
that stated the responsibilities and roles of a pilot in a visual approach. The
document stated that the pilot must inform the controller immediately if any of the
following occurs: the pilot is unable to follow the preceding aircraft, the pilot is
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unable to remain clear of clouds, the pilot is unable to retain sight of the airport, or
a climb is required (FAA, 2011).
The Flight Safety Foundation Approach and Landing Accident Reduction
(ALAR) Toolkit briefing 7.4 discusses visual approaches in detail. Flight Safety
Foundation reports that 41% of the 118 fatal approach-and-landing accidents from
1980 to 1996 involving jet aircraft with maximum takeoff weight above 12,500
pounds took place during visual approaches (Flight Safety Foundation [FSF],
2000a). Flight Safety Foundation warns against visual approaches at night and
states that pilots should only conduct visual approaches at night weather is suitable
under VFR, a published visual approach procedure is available, pattern altitude is
defined, and the flight crew is familiar with airport obstruction and hazards.
Some potential risks that FSF reports related to visual approaches are as
follows: steep approaches that results in high airspeed and excessive sink rate,
shallow approaches that can lead to Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT), various
Ground Proximity Warning System call-outs, final approach course interception
very close to the runway, incorrect crosswind correction on final, and excessive
pitch movements or banking at a low altitude (FSF, 2000).
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the risk posed by the failure of visual
awareness during visual approaches for transport category aircraft. Visual
awareness is critical while conducting visual approaches and it is important to study
the factors that can limit the capabilities of human beings to maintain visual
awareness during visual approaches.
This study will further explore the limitations of visual awareness with
special emphasis on change blindness, inattentional blindness, and visual masking.
This study explored visual approaches in aviation and conducted a detailed analysis
of the Flight Safety Foundation Aviation Safety database to study the reported
accidents during visual approaches for transport category aircraft. A total of 18
accident reports were analyzed in the study. The effect of human factors related to
visual awareness will be studied in those accidents.
The study utilized a mixed-method approach as its research method using a
causal analysis.
Research Question
How does the failure of visual awareness affect safety during visual
approaches for transport category aircraft?
Methodology
The purpose of this paper was to evaluate the risk posed by the failure of
visual awareness during visual approaches for transport category aircraft. Human
factors play a dominant role in aviation accidents around the world. Visual
approaches expose pilots to extremely high and critical visual stimuli that require
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strong visual awareness for safe operations (Thompson, 2010). Aviation has a
variety of airplanes and the technology and corresponding visual cues for every
aircraft during the visual approach are drastically different. For accuracy and
coherency of data, only data from transport category aircraft has been analyzed in
this paper.
The data analyzed in this paper is retrieved from the Flight Safety
Foundation. The Flight Safety Foundation an Aviation Safety Network that is a
“private, independent source of accurate and authoritative information on
commercial accidents and safety issues” (FSF, 2016). The Aviation Network
database reports are analyzed to study trends and common factors that have caused
incidents and accidents for transport category aircraft from 1998-2018.
Aviation Safety Database
The Aviation Safety Database describes safety occurrences of commercials,
military transport category, and commercial jetliner aircraft. The Aviation Safety
Database is maintained under the Aviation Safety Network that is supported by
Flight Safety Foundation. The Aviation Safety Network was founded in 1996 and
it is described as a private and independent initiative (FSF, 2020a). The Aviation
Safety Database claims to contain more than 20,300 incidents, accidents, and
hijackings as of November 4, 2019 (Flight Safety Foundation, 2020b).
The Aviation Safety Database developed by the Flight Safety Foundation
was used for this study due to the methodology of their analysis, reputation of the
organization, and information sourcing of the database. Flight Safety Foundation is
a non-profit international organization that has contributed to aviation safety
through research, advocacy, and education. Flight Safety Foundation consists of
aviation safety experts from all around the world and its members include airlines,
educators, and manufacturers from all over the globe. The Aviation Safety Database
draws insights and conclusions directly from either the state accident investigative
agency reports. The input of official investigative agencies and subject matter
experts enriches the validity of the data and improves the depth and accuracy of the
analysis. This paper will focus on incidents and accidents for transport category
aircraft. Flight Safety Foundation considers commercials to be aircraft capable of
carrying more than 12 passengers.
Database Selection
The Aviation Safety Network allows users to filter events based on the year
of the incident/accident, aircraft type, geographical region/country, airlines,
contributory cause, airport, or registration of the aircraft. Each category allows the
user to further filter the search for the appropriate.
Contributory Cause → Flight Crew was chosen as the classification criteria
for the data for this study. The study required accidents that were caused due to
human factors. The accidents identified were manually filtered to include accidents
that occurred during visual approaches. The database was filtered to only include
accidents that occurred during 1998-2018 and occurred during visual approaches
and were caused due to human factors. This filtering of occurrences was carried out
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manually by the researchers to include the most relevant occurrences that directly
address the research questions of this study.
These categories were chosen in correspondence to the literature review.
This study focused on aspects of visual awareness and the above-mentioned
categories fall perfectly under the scope of the failure of visual awareness. Data
were filtered to only include occurrences between 1998 and 2018. This was carried
out to account for the change in technology and procedures in the cockpit.
Occurrences before 1998 were concluded by the researcher to be outdated for the
scope and purpose of this study.
Data were further filtered to only include occurrences for transport category
aircraft. This was done to maintain the coherency of occurrences analyzed. The
Federal Aviation Administration defines transport category aircraft as those for
which a type certificate is issued under Part 21 in transport category and meet
transport category airworthiness requirements. Transport category aircraft are
“multi-engine airplanes with more than 19 seats or a maximum takeoff weight
greater than 19,000 lbs” (FAA, 2018).
Results
Flight Safety Foundation reports for the criteria illustrated above were
analyzed. Additionally, accident reports of the state accident investigation agency
were analyzed as well due to the integrity and depth of the results that were
provided in the reports.
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Table 1
List of Accidents that were Analyzed for this Study
Case
Aircraft
Date
Location
Case 1 Beechcraft 400A
17
April Beckley
1999
Airport, USA
Case 2 Lockheed C-130E 10
KuwaitHercules
December
Ahmed
Al
1999
Jaber
Air
Force Base,
Kuwait
Case 3 Dassault Falcon 20F 13
June Peterborough
2000
Airport, ON,
Canada
Case 4 Boeing 737-200
17
July Patna Airport,
2001
India
Case 5
Tupolev Tu- 4 July 2001 Irkutsk
154M
Airport,
Russia
Case 6 Swearingen SA226- 11 October Shamattawa
TC Metro II
2001
Airport,
Canada
Case 7 Antonov An24-RV 13
July Yakutsk
2002
Airport,
Russia
Case 8 Beechcraft 1900C-1 14 January Kauai
2008
Island/Lihue
Airport, USA
Case 9 Swearingen SA227- 17 August Grain ValleyAC Metro III
2006
East Kansas
City Airport,
USA
Case
Boeing 737-400
7
March Yogyakarta10
2007
Adisutjipto
Airport,
Indonesia
Case
Boeing 737-800
22
May Mangalore
12
2010
International
Airport, India
Case
SAAB 340B
13
June Marsh13
2013
Harbour
International
Airport,
Bahamas
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Reference
(NTSB [NTSB],
2000)
(FSF, 2020b)

(Transport
Safety Board,
2000)
(Court of
Inquiry, 2001)
(FSF, 2020)

(Transport
Safety Board,
2001)
(FSF, 2020)

(NTSB, 2009)

(NTSB, 2007)

(National
Transport Safety
Committee,
2007)
(Court of
Inquiry, 2010)
(Air Accident
Investigation
Bureau, 2015)
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Case
14
Case
15

Case
16

Case
17
Case
18

Boeing 777-200ER

6 July 2013

San Francisco (NTSB, 2014)
International
Airport, USA
Airbus 321-231
26
Deauville(BEA, 2018)
September Saint Gatien
2013
Airport,
France
Dassault Falcon 20E 3
March Kish
Island (Aircraft
2014
Airport, Iran
Accident
Investigation
Bureau, 2016)
Pilatus
Britten- 25
July Eteringbang
(Air Accident
Norman BN-2A-26 2017
Airport,
Investigation
Islander
Guyana
Unit, 2017)
Bombardier Dash-8 12 March Tribhuvan
(Accident
2018
International
Investigation
Airport, Nepal Commission,
2019)

A total of 18 accidents were analyzed in this study. The accidents were
analyzed to derive quantitative and qualitative data. The purpose of the quantitative
analysis was to classify accidents on the basis of lighting conditions, time of the
day, and type of operations. The quantitative analysis will be followed by the
qualitative analysis that will include a deeper analysis of the 18 accidents to derive
trends and commonalities in the accidents. The analysis helped analyze the role of
the failure of visual awareness in accidents during visual approaches for transport
category aircraft.
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Quantitative Analysis

Accident Classification By Type of
Operation
22%
44%
17%
17%

Passenger

Private

Cargo

Other

Figure 1. Classification of the accidents by the type of operations. This figure
illustrates the classification of the accidents by the type of operations.
The operations have been classified into passenger, private, cargo, and
others. The "other" category includes training, aerial work, ambulance, and
military. The accidents were classified on the basis of the local time at the
destination airport or the location when the accident occurred.
Classification of Accident by Local Time at
Destination Airport or Location of Accident

Local Time

2000-2359

0600-1959
1200-1559
0800-1159
0400-0759
0000-0359
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Number of Accidents

Figure 2. Classification of the accident on the basis of the local time at the
destination airport or the location when the accident occurred.
This figure illustrates the classification of the accident on the basis of the
local time at the destination airport or the location when the accident occurred. The
entire day has been divided into the increments of 4 hours to provide a distribution
of the period of the day when most accidents occurred. The purpose of this analysis
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is to derive data about the relation between the lighting conditions, fatigue, and
level of circadian rhythm on safety during visual approaches. Local time was used
instead of Zulu time because local time provides more relevant data for the purpose
of the analysis.
This data was used to classify the accidents on the basis of the lighting
conditions during the accidents. The exact lighting conditions were derived from
the state accident investigation reports. The lighting conditions are presented as day
(after sunrise) and night (after sunset). Accidents such as in the case of case 15
occurred during dusk where the entire operation was executed during the day but
landing occurred during the night. For such accidents, the state aviation
investigation report was consulted to analyze the exact time of the accident and the
lighting conditions at that time.

Classification Based on Lighting Conditions

7

10

Day

Night

Figure 3. Classification of the accidents on the basis of the lighting conditions at
the destination airport or the location of the accident at the time of the accident.
The flight experience of the pilot-in-command of each accident was
retrieved from the state accident investigation agency reports. The information
provided by all the reports developed by different state agencies varied and not all
the information required for the analyses could be retrieved.
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Table 2
Information of Flight Experience per Accident
Total
Time Time
on PIC Time
(Hours)
Type(model)
in in hours
hours
Case 1
4719
107
2185
Case 3
11800
9400
Case 4
4361
1778
Case 6
3100
1100
Case 8
3098
1480
Case 9
1379
188
1127
Case 10
12421
3703
Case 11
3596
1186
2760
Case 12
10216
2845
10216
Case 13
8500
4700
Case 14
9684
33
3729
Case 15
7025
6124
1347
Case 17
4760
Case 18
5518
2824
-

Last 90 days
(Hours)
122
100
132
110
178
241
109
147
33
312
320
191

The information in Table 2 has been compiled from all the accident reports
studied for this study.
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Total Flight Time (Hours)

Classfication of Accident According to Total Flight
Experience of PIC
11,000-11,999
9000-9999
7000-7999
4000-4999
1000-1999
0

1

2

3

Number of Accidents

Figure 4. Classification of the accidents by the total flight time of the PIC before
the accident. The purpose of this analysis is to study the variation of the accidents
by total flight experience of the PIC. Due to the unavailability of complete data,
some accidents have not been included in this analysis.

Classification of Accident By Flight Time of PIC on
Type(Model)
Flight Time (Hours)

9000-9999
6000-6999
4000-4999
3000-3999
2000-2999
1000-1999
0-909
0

1

2

3

4

Number of Accidents

Figure 5: Classification of the accidents by the total flight time of the PIC on the
type(model) of the aircraft flown during the accident. Due to the unavailability of
complete data, some accidents have not been included in this analysis.
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Time in Past 90 Days

Classification of Accidents By Hours in the Past 90
Days
300-399
200-299
100-199
0-99
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Number of Accidents

Figure 6. Classification of the accidents by the total flight time of the PIC in the 90
days before the accident. Due to the unavailability of complete data, some accidents
have not been included in this analysis.
Qualitative Analysis
The 18 accidents that were analyzed for this study were selected according
to the criteria detailed in the methodology section of this paper. The database was
also filtered to study accidents for which at least one contributory factor could be
linked to the failure of visual awareness during the approach phase. This allowed
the researchers to study a much-focused database that allowed a detailed and
relevant analysis to satisfy the scope of the study and research question.
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Table 3
Causal Factors Identified in the 18 Accidents
Case
Causal Factors
Case 1
Misjudgment of altitude and airspeed
Case 2
Situational Awareness, spatial disorientation, and CRM
Case 3
Somatogravic illusion, task saturation, and situational awareness
Case 4
CRM
Case 5
Pilot error (No relation to physiological factors noted)
Case 6
Somatogravic illusion, task saturation, and situational awareness
Case 7
Task saturation, situational awareness, and fatigue
Case 8
Task saturation, fatigue, and spatial disorientation
Case 9
Fatigue (long duty periods and irregular sleep for the pilots)
Case 10
CRM
Case 11
CRM and fatigue
Case 12
Fatigue and CRM
Case 13
CRM
Case 14
Fatigue and task saturation
Case 15
CRM
Case 16
Fatigue, spatial disorientation,
Case 17
Pilot error (No relation to physiological factors noted)
Case 18
Disorientation, CRM, and situational awareness
Table 3 was created after examining the contributory factors listed in the
state aviation accident investigation reports. It was noted that each accident had
more than one contributory factor.
Table 4
Frequency of Identified Causal Factors
Contributory Factors
Misjudgment
Situational Awareness
Disorientation and Illusions
Fatigue
Lack of CRM
Task Saturation and Task Management
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Classification of Accidents Based on
Identified Contributory Factors
8
7

Frequency

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Misjudgement

Situational
Awareness

Disorientation
and Illusion

Fatigue

Lack of CRM Task Saturation

Causal Factors

Figure 7. Classification of accidents based on identified contributory factors.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Based on the analysis of the 18 accidents, the following were regarded as
the key takeaways:
Lack of CRM, Fatigue, and situational awareness were analyzed to be the leading
causes of accidents due to human errors related to visual awareness.
Two fatal accidents where loss of visual references on final led to somatogravic
illusions.
Flying a visual approach during periods of ‘Low Circadian Levels’ was analyzed
to pose a major risk.
Poor CRM practices described as a major risk by investigating agencies.
Lack of simulator training for visual approaches considered a factor in accidents.
Incomplete approach briefings a major cause of errors during visual approaches.
Geographical features around the airport play a role in illusions and misjudgment
which can lead to black hole approaches.
Lack of visual references during the visual approach (due to geographical features
or environmental conditions) led to disorientation and incorrect input by pilots.
The effect of fatigue on perceptual vision and visual attention during visual
approaches was analyzed as a factor.
The key take-aways have been adapted from the detailed analysis of the
accident reports of all 18 accidents. A more detailed analysis of the factors, causes,
and recommendations by the investigators for each case that led to the take-aways
of this qualitative analysis is presented below:
Loss of visual references on the final led to somatogravic illusions in two
separate accidents. The two accidents are Case 3 (Dassault Falcon 20F, 13 June
2000) and Case 6 (Swearingen SA226-TC Metro II, 11 October 2001). In Case 6,
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the accident occurred during the night (Transport Safety Board, 2001). The state
agency investigation report discusses the illusions that could have played a role in
the pilot losing situational awareness. The report quotes a previous Transport Safety
Board of Canada report for a crash involving a Metroliner 3 in September 1989.
The report discusses that “errors in the perception of attitude can occur when
aircrew are exposed to force environments that differ significantly from those
experienced during normal activity on the surface of the earth where the force of
gravity is a stable reference and is regarded as the vertical” (Transport Safety
Board, 2001, p. 4). The report discusses how a lack of visual reference (possible in
Case 6 as the approach was conducted in the night) leads the pilots into depending
on the vestibular organs for the perception of motion and position. Vestibular
illusions occur in circumstances when the vestibular organs incorrectly sense
motion and/or position. Somatogravic illusion is a type of vestibular illusion
(Transport Safety Board, 2001). When the body which is positioned in a relatively
stable field undergoes horizontal acceleration (in the case of the flight, the pilot
moves the throttle forward), the otolith organs in the semi-circular canal of the year
are stimulated in the same way as when the head is titled backward. The human
being (pilot) gets a false perception of pitching up and reacts by pushing the nose
of the airplane forward. This results in an increase in airspeed and loss of altitude
(Transport Safety Board, 2001). The TSBC report states that somatogravic illusions
are “particularly dangerous when it occurs on take-off or when overshooting,
especially at night or in poor visibility” (Transport Safety Board, 2001, p. 5). The
report also states that “the loss of visual references as the aircraft accelerated along
the runway and past the lights of the community were ideal for the onset of
somatogravic illusion in the pilot flying” (p. 8). The report also states the loss of
situational awareness after the go-around as a contributory factor for the accident.
While somatogravic illusion is a type of vestibular illusion, it is caused by
a loss of adequate visual references for which failure of visual awareness of visual
stimuli when the human being is presented with multiple visual stimuli can be a
factor (FAA, 2016b). In the case of a go-around during the night, the pilots have to
rely on a few unreliable visual references. Inadequate visual attention to the few
visual references available will lead to losing that visual awareness or inattentional
blindness (not observing visual references even while directly looking at them).
In Case 3, the accident was investigated by the Transport Safety Board of
Canada (Transport Safety Board of Canada, 2000). The report states pilots losing
situation awareness while being subjected to somatogravic illusion. This flight was
conducted during the night as well and the accident occurred while the pilot was
turning to final to align with the runway during a visually flown circling approach.
The workload and limited visual cues on the final approach at a low altitude can
lead a pilot to develop somatogravic illusion (Transport Safety Board of Canada,
2000). The report of the accident states that lack of a visual horizon, especially in
the night, places a high risk for somatogravic illusion. The accident report also
mentions “inadequate monitoring of flight instruments contributed to the loss of
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situational awareness” (Transport Safety Board, 2000, p. 11). The report also
delegates the lack of crew resource management in the cockpit as a factor that leads
to the loss of visual awareness of the surroundings. The pilots had delegated
responsibilities for scanning instruments and the external visual references. The
captain was primarily focused on the flight instruments and the first officer was
responsible for altitude references. Even while the first officer warned the captain
of the aircraft being low on the approach, mainly due to the Precision Approach
Path Indicator (PAPI) light along the runway, the captain had an inadequate
response which could primarily be due to loss of situational awareness.
The analysis of the two accidents presented a lot of similarities. The loss of
visual awareness due to either lack of visual attention of references or the lack of
visual references themselves present a high risk of developing somatogravic
illusion (or any other vestibular illusion) and losing situational awareness. As in
Case 3, the lack of adequate CRM practices can contribute to losing situational
awareness due to the loss of visual awareness of references.
Loss of situational awareness and spatial disorientation was a major cause
of accidents during visual approaches. The NTSB concluded that in Case 1, the
accident was caused because the "pilot-in-command misjudged his altitude and
airspeed" (NTSB, 1999, p. 1). AIB delegated loss of situational awareness and
spatial disorientation to be a cause in Case 2 as well along with “lack of support
from co-pilot and navigator” indicating poor CRM in the cockpit (FSF, 1999, p. 1).
The Court of Inquiry that investigated Case 4 stated that several actions “indicated
a lack of CRM” in the cockpit that led to the pilot stalling during the visual approach
(Court of Inquiry, 2001, p. 107). The investigation for Case 7 leads to the
conclusion that the pilots missed crucial visual cues while conducting the visual
approach which was aggravated by the crew losing situational awareness and task
saturation (FSF, 2020). The crew's action indicated signs of fatigue as well. In Case
8, the pilot was conducting a visual approach while following a Boeing 737 (NTSB,
2009). The NTSB report stated task saturation, fatigue, and spatial disorientation to
be factors that led the pilot to miss the "few external visual references" that were
present during the approach (NTSB, 2009, p. 1).
The NTSB report stated that the few available visual references during the
visual approach “increased the importance of monitoring flight instruments to
maintain awareness of the airplane attitude and altitude” (NTSB, 2009, p. 1). Due
to the surrounding demographic features and lighting conditions, the pilot had few
visual references during the visual approach while also delegating attention towards
the preceding aircraft. These tasks required “visual attention outside the cockpit”
while also focusing visual attention inside the cockpit towards the cockpit
instruments (p. 1). The NTSB concluded that these conditions “created shifting
visual frames of reference, left the pilot vulnerable to common visual and vestibular
illusions, and reduced his awareness of the airplane's attitude, altitude, and
trajectory” (p. 1).
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The NTSB concluded that the unstable approach in Case 9 was caused by
fatigue due to long duty periods and irregular sleep (NTSB, 2007). The most
comprehensive analysis of the effects of fatigue on pilot performance was described
in the NTSB report of Case 9. The report discussed the effects of fatigue on “Timing
disruption” and “Disruption of the Perpetual field.” The report described
“disruption of the perceptual field” as “Concentrating attention upon movements or
objects in the center of vision and neglecting those in the periphery” (NTSB, 2007,
p. 8). The threats of this effect include “loss of accuracy and smoothness in control
movements” (p. 8). The pilots had revealed that he was "tired" and had missed out
on sleep due to a variety of reasons mentioned in the report (p. 8). The effects of
fatigue on perceptual vision and timing disruption were studied in depth in the
report.
In Case 10, flight crew coordination and communication led to the ‘pilot
flying’ maneuvering the airplane too steep on the approach (National Transport
Safety Committee, 2007). The pilot did not pay visual attention to the indicators in
the cockpit indicating an unstabilized approach. The pilot also ignored the auditory
GPWS callouts indicating an unstabilized approach. The investigation also
recommended enhanced simulator training for pilots on visual approaches and
responses to warning such as GPWS warnings during approaches (NTSB, 2007).
In Case 11, the NTSB concluded that the pilots exhibited a lack of CRM
procedures and extreme fatigue due to lack of sleep in the preceding days of the
accident due to the duration of the pilots’ duty periods (NTSB, 2011).
In Case 12, fatigue played a major role that led to several decisions leading
to the unstabilized approach (Court of Inquiry, 2010). The investigation report
stated that the captain was asleep during the flight for the first 1 hour and 40 minutes
of the 2 hours and 5 minutes of CVR records. The investigation stated that the pilot's
sleepiness could have "possibly led to sleep inertia and impaired judgment" during
the approach (Court of Inquiry, 2010, p. ix). The report also started the influence of
flying during the "period of Window of Circadian Low" (WoCL) and its effects on
the judgment and performance of the pilot (Court of Inquiry, 2010, p. 1). This led
to the pilot not focusing visual attention on cockpit instruments during the approach
and missing crucial visual warnings that indicated a highly unstabilized approach.
The lack of CRM was investigated as well as the captain had ignored multiple
concerns and go-around calls from the first officer (3 go-around calls from the first
officer recorded in the CVR). The investigation also recommended enhanced
simulator training for pilots to identify visual cues and warnings and responses to
unstabilized approaches. Further, the investigation stated that the airline (Air India
Express) operated to multiple “critical airfields” that characterized enhanced threats
during approaches, especially visual approaches (p. 79). The investigation
recommended the airline to develop enhanced simulator training for pilots for
“critical airfields” (p. 79).
For Case 13, The investigating agency AAID Bahamas concluded “lack of
crew resource management training” to be a contributory factor for the accident
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(Air Accident Investigation Bureau, 2015, p. 15). The pilots continued the
unstabilized approach visually and exchanged controls multiple times below 1000
feet AGL. The pilots were distracted by stimuli outside and inside the cockpit that
resulted in the pilots missing various visual cues that indicated an unstabilized
approach. The AAID Bahamas accident investigation report stated that the pilot and
co-pilot stated at “differing times that they had the runway in sight, then they lost
sight of it, then they had it again and then lost it again, this process repeated several
times up to the point of touch down. It was evident from the CVR recording that
neither pilot definitively had the runway in sight” (p. 11). An external factor that
played a key role in the accident was the weather with a thunderstorm cell situated
right over the airfield during the time of the approach. The report stated that “Due
to the weather conditions, visibility of the runway was intermittent, yet the crew
continued descending visually in an attempt to land the aircraft on a runway that
was not in sight and not served by an instrument landing system (ILS) or other
navigational aid used during inclement weather or periods of reduced visibility” (p.
13). The Aeronautical Decision Making of the pilots was examined in the
investigation as well.
In Case 14, the investigation by the NTSB concluded that “although the ILS
glideslope was out of service, the lack of a glideslope should not have precluded
the pilots’ successful completion of a visual approach” (NTSB, 2014, p. 77). Due
to multiple visual cues available to the pilots such as the PAPI and “visual aspect
of the runway” (p.77) The NTSB report also indicated that the pilots indicated
fatigue that resulted in the pilots being “fixated” while cross-checking the
instruments (p. 86). The NTSB concluded that “that the flight crew was
experiencing fatigue, which likely degraded their performance during the
approach” (p. 86). The NTSB advocated for Fatigue Risk Management System
(FRMS) for airlines to collect data and make changes to factors such as scheduling
to minimize the effects of fatigue. The NTSB also evaluated the cross-checking of
instruments by the pilot-flying and stated that the plot “did not adequately monitor
airspeed between 500 and 200 ft” which “likely resulted from a combination of
workload, expectancy, and a coincidence of timing” (p. 88). The NTSB also stated
about automation and its effect on visual approaches that “likely resulted from a
combination of workload, expectancy, and a coincidence of timing” (p. 88).
Additionally, NTSB also states that automation reduces monitoring performance
“decreases the likelihood that a human operator will detect signs of anomalous or
unexpected system behavior involving the processes under automatic control” (p.
90). The NTSB summarized that “insufficient flight crew monitoring of airspeed
indications during the approach likely resulted from expectancy, increased
workload, fatigue, and automation reliance” (p. 90). The NTSB recommended the
operator to enhance simulator training for visual approaches to improve the pilot's
response to unstabilized approaches, automation, and human-machine interaction.
In Case 15, the investigative agency concluded the lack of CRM during the
final approach to be a cause of the “serious incident” (BEA, 2018, p. 1). During the
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approach, the pilots had missed vital visual cues of deviation of speed and descent
profile and missed out on callouts as mandated by the Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs) of the airline. The aircraft was not stabilized during the
approach and at 1, 000 feet AGL, the aircraft was 57 knots higher than the approach
speed of the aircraft. The investigative agency concluded that fatigue due to the
flight duty period of nearly 15 hours was a factor for the impaired judgment and
inability of the pilots to recognize cues indicating an unstabilized visual approach.
The investigative agency analyzed that flying over the ocean during the circling
approach to play a factor in the pilots' developing illusions due to the lack of
adequate visual references. The investigative agency also recommended enhanced
simulator training to account for abnormal procedures such as rejection of landing
at a low altitude during a visual approach. The agency also recommended the
operator to include evidence-based training in its simulator training curriculum
(BEA, 2018).
For Case 16, the investigative agency concluded fatigue to be the primary
contributor to the accident during the visual approach (Aircraft Accident
Investigation Bureau, 2016). The "main cause of the accident" was reported to be
the pilots being fatigued which caused an inability of the pilots "to adopt themselves
with flight conditions and their interactions are due to spatial disorientation
(illusion)” (p. 3). The report also observed various external factors that contributed
to the pilot’s losing visual references during the approach. The pilots were landing
during sunset and the landing runway (Runway 27) was in the direction of the
setting sun while flying over featureless terrain (the sea). These factors contributed
to developing spatial disorientation during the visual approach.
For Case 17, the investigative agency recommended the operator to “review
its special procedures and develop more comprehensive approach procedures” for
the airport (Air Accident Investigation Unit, 2017, p. 28).
In Case 18, the investigative agency concluded that disorientation and loss
of situational awareness to be causes for the accident (Accident Investigation
Commission, 2019). The visual approach was unstabilized with an “offset to the
proper approach path that led to maneuvers in a very dangerous and unsafe attitude
to align with the runway” (p. 40). The pilots have initiated the visual approach
without the runway or preceding aircraft in sight and sighted the airport at very
close proximity to the airport and at a low altitude. Poor CRM procedures were
concluded to be a cause of the accident as well due to a "steep gradient” between
the crew (p. 40). The CVR data also revealed that “PIC lacked adequate sleep the
previous night prior to the flight" (p. 36). This could have contributed towards the
impaired judgment and loss of situational awareness during the visual approach.
The airport of landing (Tribhuvan International Airport, Katmandu) was also an
airport with high terrain and a steep approach path which made the visual approach
to the runways particularly challenging. The investigation report revealed that none
of the pilots had even practiced a visual approach to the airport in a simulator. While
the PIC had operated to the airport multiple times before the accident, the co-pilot
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was flying to the airport for the first time which would have been a factor in the
lack of CRM in the cockpit along with the "steep gradient" between the crew which
"prevented FO in assisting and being more assertive in significant phases of flight
like approach and landing” (p. 36). The investigation report also revealed that
“there was a lack of clear communication between the crew members" (p. 36). The
investigative agency recommended the operator to include the approach to the
airport as a part of its simulator training curriculum and including a safety pilot (3rd
pilot) for flights with high workload and high chances of task saturation, loss of
situational awareness, and disorientation during the approach.
Discussion
The analysis of the accident investigation reports indicates that the failure
of visual awareness poses significant risks for visual approaches in transport
category aircraft. The literature review studied the theoretical aspects of the failure
of visual awareness with an overview of inattentional blindness, change blindness,
and visual masking. While the accident investigation reports did not directly cite
any of the failure of visual awareness studied in the literature review, the reports
did mention the role of visual acuity and awareness as factors for increasing the
risks of disorientation or illusions and loss of situational awareness.
A direct correlation between factors such as fatigue, poor CRM, and lack of
approach briefings and failure of visual awareness could not be established.
However, fatigue, poor CRM, and lack of approach briefings were analyzed to be
factors that posed risks during visual approaches for transport category aircraft.
While many of the findings from the qualitative analysis did corroborate
many aspects reviewed in the literature review, the quantitative analysis did not
corroborate any of the theoretical aspects studied in the literature review. The
quantitative data studied helped provide a better overview and context of the
accidents that were analyzed for this study.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to evaluate the risk posed by the failure of
visual awareness during visual approaches for transport category aircraft. The
research question for this study was “How does the failure of visual awareness
affect safety during visual approaches for transport category aircraft?”
The qualitative analysis of the accidents did significantly indicate that the
failure of visual awareness is a significant risk for safety during visual approaches.
It was analyzed that several other factors could contribute towards increasing the
risk of pilots losing visual awareness and attention. Some factors that increased the
likelihood of losing visual awareness and attention were analyzed were task
saturation, fatigue, lack of CRM, low lighting conditions, and lack of visual
references.
The analysis did highlight that in an environment when pilots were
subjected any of the factors mentioned above, pilots did miss out on visual cues
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indicative of unstabilized approaches inside and outside the cockpit. Some of the
visual cues the pilots were not visually attentive to inside the cockpit were the
aircraft instruments that indicated an unstabilized approach such as vertical speed
indicator or altimeter and other forms of visual warnings such as the Ground
Proximity Warning Systems indications. Some of the visual cues outside the
cockpit were the visual references outside the cockpit such as the runway
environment and the PAPI or VASI lights on.
The lack of CRM, fatigue, low lighting conditions, lack of visual references,
and task saturation posed hazards beyond impairing the visual awareness for the
pilots. The factors also led to pilots developing visual and vestibular illusions such
as somatogravic illusions. In fact, somatogravic illusion was attributed as a factor
in two accidents. In total, six accident investigation reports revealed some form of
illusion or disorientation as a factor for the accident.
An analysis of the reports revealed that task saturation during a visual
approach was a major factor that led to pilots developing spatial disorientation or
illusions. In conclusion, the data studied in study can be used to develop operating
practices to mitigate the risk of the failure of visual awareness during visual
approaches.
Limitations
The results and analysis of this study was just limited to the findings in the
state aviation accident reports. No primary data was collected which restricted a
more comprehensive analysis of the accidents. The accidents occurred that different
countries around the world and the investigation was conducted by different
aviation accident investigation agencies. There was a lack of uniformity in the
reports and there were several cases where the reports lacked data that was needed
for a more comprehensive analysis.

•

•
•
•
•

Practical Applications and Recommendations
The following recommendations have been formulated after studying the
recommendations and analysis of all 18 accidents.
Risk management procedures to identify ‘high risk airports’ and routes that
consider flight duty periods, physiological factors such as ‘Low Circadian Levels’
during operations, and geographical features near the airport that could induce
visual illusions.
Enhanced simulator training and crew qualifications for conducting visual
approaches at high risk airports.
Fatigue risk management to study the risk of physiological factors on visual
approaches.
Enhanced crew resource management procedures during visual approaches at high
risk airports.
Improved approach briefings by flight crew to identify possible hazards to visual
awareness and illusions.
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